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WINNER, BEST APPELLATE BRIEF IN THE 2009 NATIVE
AMERICAN LAW STUDENT ASSOCIATION MOOT COURT
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Alex Hagen* & JR. LaPlante"
Statement of Issues
I. Does the Fort Howe State tuition waiver policy violate the Colorado state
constitutional prohibition on racial preferences by requiring that a student
prove the existence of ancestral ties to a historical Colorado tribe in order to
be eligible for the waiver?
II. Does the Fort Howe State tuition waiver policy violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Statement of the Case
L Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below
This appeal stems from a dispute regarding the legality of a tuition waiver
policy of Fort Howe State University (hereinafter FHSU), a state university
located in Bancos, Colorado. Since 1978, FHSU has followed a policy of
granting tuition waivers to certain American Indian students who can prove
ancestral ties to American Indian tribes that inhabited Colorado in the past. In
2007, Colorado citizens passed a constitutional amendment (hereinafter
Colorado Racial Preference Ban) that bans the use of racial or gender
preferences in any state-funded programs. A challenge to the constitutionality
of the FHSU waiver policy followed shortly after this amendment was
adopted.
In January 2008, plaintiff Tammy Chapman filed a lawsuit in federal district
court alleging that the FHSU tuition waiver policy violated both the state
constitutional amendment and the federal Equal Protection Clause. Chapman,
a non-Indian student at FHSU, was subsequently joined by Elisa Begay, a
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Navajo tribal member who also attended FHSU. Plaintiffs claimed that FHSU
granted the tuition waivers on the basis of race and unconstitutionally
discriminated against non-Indian students and Indian students who were not
connected to either specified tribe as a result.
In response, FHSU filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the
policy was not a racial preference, but instead a political preference that
advanced an important state objective of ensuring that American Indians have
access to public educational opportunities. FHSU contended that the policy
was necessary to satisfy Colorado's unique obligation to descendants of tribes
whom it displaced or otherwise harmed in the past. The plaintiffs filed an
opposing reply and a cross-motion for summary judgment. The lower court
found that the tuition waiver preferences were not racial preferences on their
face, but instead were of a political character designed to benefit students
whose ancestors belonged to groups to whom the State of Colorado has a
unique obligation. The lower court held that because the preferences were not
racial, they did not violate the state constitutional amendment.
The lower court also found that the policy did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause because it was consistent with federal policies regarding
Indian education. Though the court acknowledged that states may not make
their own Indian policy, it ruled that state policies that are in accord with
federal objectives advance the unique obligation owed to Indian tribes. Based
on these findings, the lower court granted summary judgment to FHSU, and
the plaintiffs subsequently brought this appeal.
II. Statement of the Facts
FHSU explains the rationale underlying its tuition waiver policy in an
official statement outlining the eligibility criteria and aims of the policy. The
university's statement touches on its own unique history, the historical
interactions between the state and particular tribes, and the particular remedies
the policy is designed to provide. The statement reads in full:
Fort Howe State University is a state-funded public institution of
higher education. The land that the Fort Howe campus occupies is
land that was once the territory of the Ute tribes. The wealth and
prosperity that helped to create the Colorado state system of higher
education can be traced in no small part to the state's role in
divesting the Utes, and the other Indian tribes that inhabited the
Colorado territory, of their natural resources, their hunting grounds,
and ultimately their homes. In addition, federal and state policies
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries directed
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol34/iss1/7
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public money to educational programs designed to destroy the
cultural and political life of Colorado's tribes. To repair these
historical wrongs, and to enrich the cultural and intellectual
diversity of the educational environment at Fort Howe State
University, Fort Howe offers a full tuition waiver to American
Indians who can trace their heritage to an historical Colorado
Indian tribe. Members of the Ute Mountain Ute and Southern Ute
tribes are automatically eligible for the tuition waiver. Other
American Indian applicants will be considered on a case-by-case
basis to determine their eligibility for the tuition waiver, consistent
with its stated purposes.
The eligibility criteria establish a three-tiered system of preferences based on
the degree of an applicant's ancestral connection to a historical Colorado
Indian tribe. Enrolled members of the Ute Mountain Ute or Southern Ute
tribes are automatically eligible. Members of other federally recognized tribes
who can show lineal descent from either of these tribes are also eligible.
Finally, FHSU has also waived the tuition of at least one student who was
ethnically American Indian, had cultural and political connections to her tribe,
could trace her ancestry to one of the historical Colorado tribes, but was not
a member of any federally recognized tribe.
Although FHSU enacted the tuition waiver policy in 1978, no student
applied for the scholarship until 1985. Over the next twenty-three years, the
university granted the tuition waiver to twenty-seven students. Fifteen
recipients were enrolled in the Southern Ute Tribe, and ten recipients were
enrolled in the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe. One recipient was enrolled in the
Navajo tribe with Southern Ute ancestry, and one recipient was of Taos
Puebloan, Southern Ute, and Lakota Sioux heritage but had insufficient blood
quanta to be enrolled in any of those tribes. Every recipient of the tuition
waiver has been ethnically American Indian, which is a necessary, but not
sufficient condition according to the policy's terms.
In addition to the official policy statement's explanation of the purpose
behind the tuition waivers, FHSU also claimed in the lower court that the
policy was intended to assure that Indians had access to educational
opportunities. As a general proposition, there are significant disparities
between the educational performance of Indian students and white students.
Although FHSU did not submit any empirical data that specifies the effects or
harm that tribal members suffered due to the historical settlement of Colorado,
Jay House, an enrolled Navajo whose maternal grandparents were Southern
Ute, indicated in a signed affidavit that he would not have been able to attend
FHSU without the benefit of the tuition waiver.
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The Colorado Racial Preference Ban does not include an exception for state
programs that advance a compelling interest. It imposes a per se prohibition
on preferences based on race or gender. Thus, if the policy is found to create
a racial preference, the policy is illegal in Colorado.
III. Standard of Review
This appeal stems from a summary-judgment motion that the lower court
granted to defendants-appellees. This court reviews grants of motions for
summary judgment de novo. See Gutierrez v. City of San Antonio, 139 F.3d
441 (5th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment is appropriate when it is
demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). This court must consider all materials in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion for summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144
(1970). The judge's function at the summary-judgment stage is not to weigh
the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 249 (1986). Appellees respectfully submit that no dispute of material fact
exists and that the lower court correctly held that FHSU is entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law.
IV Argument
I. The Fort Howe State University Tuition Waiver Is Valid Under the
Colorado Ban on Racial Preferences Because It Is Based on a Political
Classification
Indian tribes have a political relationship with the federal government.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). This relationship has
fostered a variety of federal policies that promote differential treatment based
on the status of tribes as independent sovereigns. Ignorance of the unique
character of this relationship would suggest that such differential treatment is
based on race. Indeed, the Supreme Court recognizes that members of Indian
communities share a common race. Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261,
266 (1901); United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 573 (1846);
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 22. But the Court has never found this
as a basis to invalidate legislation that singles Indians out for differential
treatment. Rather, it has recognized that such legislation is justified in light of
the extra-racial status of tribal sovereigns under the Constitution. That
[Vol. 34206
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol34/iss1/7
SPECIAL FEATURES
document expressly identifies tribes as political entities with whom the federal
government will interact. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("Congress shall have
Power ... to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes. . . ."). In order to understand the disputed
issues before this court, it is vital to acknowledge that tribes are "distinct
political communities." Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557
(1832). This legal principle governs the analysis of governmental programs
dealing with Indians as a discrete class.
A. FHSU's Tuition Waiver Policy Enacts a System ofDifferential Treatment
for a Discrete Class of Individuals Who Descend from Select Tribes with
Whom Colorado Has a Unique Historical and Political Relationship
The federal government has numerous responsibilities to Indian tribes,
which have a unique legal stature in the American political system. Though
tribes retain a degree of inherent sovereignty, they are nevertheless subject to
the plenary power of Congress. See, e.g., Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie
Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520, 531 n. 6, (1998); United States v. Wheeler, 435
U.S. 313, 319 (1978); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564-65 (1903);
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886). The exercise of
plenary power dovetails with a core bundle of responsibilities stemming from
treaties and the trust and fiduciary relationships the federal government has
with Indian tribes generally.
Whether created through treaties, the trust relationship, or specific
congressional statutes, the federal government's obligations to Indian tribes are
part and parcel of tribes' special political status. That status provides the
rationale for preferential benefits accorded to Indian people. Such political
preferences are categorically distinct from racially based preferences that
receive strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. Entire volumes of
the United States Code are premised on this distinction. There is no basis for
departing from the clear line of case law and doctrinal interpretation
confirming its constitutional status.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the
political and legal status of Indian tribes is singular in character. In Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831), Chief Justice Marshall
observed that "the relation of the Indians to the United States is marked by
peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist no where else." It is thus
unsurprising that Congress and the federal courts have seen fit to create legal
classifications that distinguish between Indians and non-Indians in a number
of significant ways. The FHSU tuition waiver policy at issue in this case is
substantively similar to a number of such classifications that have long been
No. 1]1 207
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considered constitutional because they rest on the political character ofquasi-
sovereign tribal entities.
Preferences that distinguish Indians from non-Indians and treat each class
differently do not fall under the general principle that racial distinctions
amount to racial discrimination. This feature of Indian law jurisprudence is
determinative of the questions before this Court and ultimately proves fatal to
plaintiffs' equal-protection arguments. A long line of unambiguous precedent
affirms differential treatment based on the unique political status of American
Indians. See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 673 n. 20 (1979) (treaties securing preferential
fishing rights); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645-47 (1977)
(acknowledging exclusive federal jurisdiction over crimes committed by
Indians in Indian Country); Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks,
430 U.S. 73, 84-85 (1977) (distribution of tribal property); Moe v.
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes ofthe Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S.
463, 479-80 (1976) (Indian immunity from state taxes); Fisher v. District
Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390-91 (1976) (per curiam) (acknowledging exclusive
tribal-court jurisdiction over tribal adoptions).
B. The Eligibility Criteria FHSU Uses to Determine Whether a Student
Qualifies for the Tuition Waiver Are Permissible Grounds for Recognizing
the Unique Political Status Accorded to American Indians Under the Law
The eligibility criteria employed by FHSU are designed to identify only
those individuals who can trace their heritage back to the select tribes with
whom the State of Colorado has a unique political and cultural relationship.
The criteria follow acceptable methods of signifying "Indian" status that have
been upheld in the past. Though the eligibility criteria that favor Indians may
vary, two primary methods are employed: use of blood quanta and proof of
enrollment in a federally recognized tribe. For instance, the statutory
preference upheld in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974), favored
individuals who were both of "one-fourth or more degree Indian blood and ...
member[s] of a Federally-recognized tribe." Id. at 554 n.24. Other courts
have likewise signaled approval of blood quanta as a means of defining the
class of individuals who qualify for a preference based on the unique political
status of Indians. See Alaska Chapter, Associated General Contractors of
America, Inc. v. Pierce, 694 F.2d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 1982); Mullenberg v.
United States, 857 F.2d 770, 772 (D. Mont. 1988) ("Blood quantum
classification for employment ... is permissible for Indian status ... .").
Blood quanta is a permissible eligibility criterion, but it has been challenged
when used exclusively. At least one federal circuit court has also found that
208 [Vol. 34
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proof of membership in a federally recognized tribe is sufficient to be eligible
for grants for higher education, even if the recipient could not show that she
had one-fourth or more Indian blood. Zarr v. Barlow, 800 F.2d 1484, 1490-93
(9th Cir. 1986). Conversely, federal courts have also held that one need not
be an enrolled member to be considered "Indian" before the law. See United
States v. Pemberton, 405 F.3d 656 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming the proposition
that individuals who hold themselves out to be Indian and who are of Indian
blood are Indians under the federal statute addressing criminal jurisdiction in
Indian Country); United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir.
1979) ("Enrollment is the common evidentiary means of establishing Indian
status, but it is not the only means nor is it necessarily determinative.") For
additional discussion of variations on criteria used to define "Indian," see infra
Part II-A-2.
The case law demonstrates that, as a threshold issue, a party will be
recognized as Indian so long as some combination of accepted indicia-blood
quanta, membership, the individual's life circumstances-is present. Thus,
there is no set definition of "Indian" at work in federal law, especially because
the criteria for membership vary from tribe to tribe. The FHSU policy
consciously employs a strict set of criteria to identify a narrow class of
American Indians who are eligible for the tuition waiver. The district court
recognized as much when it observed that
[t]he presence of Ms. Begay as a co-plaintiff supports the
conclusion that the Fort Howe policy does not benefit those who
are racially American Indian. Ms. Begay is a member of the
Navajo Nation, is 100% Navajo by lineage, but is not eligible for
the tuition waiver because she cannot trace her heritage to an
historical Colorado tribe.
Chapman v. Fort Howe State University, XX F. Supp. 3d XXX (2008).
FHSU's policy targets individuals whose ancestors experienced hardships
because of the state's growth and its cooperation in federal policies that sought
to destroy the cultural integrity and way of life of tribes within Colorado's
boundaries. See Plaintifs' Exhibit 1. A close examination of the policy's
history makes clear that FHSU does not indiscriminately award tuition waivers
to any American Indian. Rather, it requires some showing of an ancestral
connection to the Ute Mountain Ute and Southern Ute tribes. Twenty-five of
the twenty-seven recipients of the waiver were enrolled members in one of
these tribes when granted the tuition waiver. One recipient (Jay House) was
enrolled in the Navajo tribe, but provided evidence of descent from the
Southern Ute tribe. The other recipient (Lily Esposito) was of Lakota, Taos
No. 1] 209
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Puebloan, and Southern Ute heritage, but lacked sufficient blood quanta to be
enrolled in any of these tribes. Nevertheless, Ms. Esposito satisfied the
eligibility criteria because she was a lineal descendant of the Southern Ute
Tribe. This history shows that the FHSU policy is not rooted in racial
categories, but instead requires evidence of connection to one of the two tribes
with whom Colorado has a unique political and historical relationship.
The FHSU eligibility criteria adopt a flexible-but-rigorous standard that
treats as its benchmark proof of connection to one of two federally recognized
tribes. This approach more faithfully adheres to the requirement that systems
of differential treatment benefiting Indians focus on the political character of
tribal sovereigns, rather than on mere racial traits of individual Indians.
Plaintiffs misconstrue the policy when they claim that it is based on
individuals' ethnic background. In actuality, the policy emphasizes the
collective political and historical ties that bind the Ute nations and Colorado.
The plaintiffs ignore this emphasis. Their position assumes that all Indians and
all Indian tribes are similarly situated and treats tribes as if they are fungible
entities that lack distinct cultural, political, or historical identities. This view
is erroneous. It puts an onerous burden on tribes as they strive to define their
own aspirations, respond to the problems they face, and build the institutions
that are necessary to advance their collective interests. See, e.g., Max
Minzner, Treating Tribes Differently: Civil Jurisdiction Inside and Outside
Indian Country, 6 Nev. L.J. 89 (2005); Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal
Fungibility, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1069 (2004); Ezra Rosser, Ambiguity and the
Academic: The Dangerous Attraction ofPan-IndianLegalAnalysis, 119 Harv.
L. Rev. F. 141 (2005).
The lower court understood that denial of the waiver to plaintiff Begay was
not evidence of the policy's racial basis, but proof that it places political status
over and above ethnic background. This observation clarifies the nature of the
policy and the aim that it serves. Colorado has admirably taken responsibility
for its role in divesting the Ute nations of their ancestral homelands and
perpetuating educational policies in the past that tore their social fabrics apart.
The tuition waiver policy is a modest measure to rectify the evils of the past
and begin to establish mutual respect with tribal people. Moreover, the policy
clearly falls within similar programs that target a discrete class of Indian
peoples and attempt to respond to their unique needs.
The citizens of Colorado have chosen to prohibit consideration of race or
gender in any state-funded programs. This prohibition does not touch the
policy at issue in this appeal, which is grounded in the perception that the State
of Colorado should affirmatively assume an obligation to descendants of two
federally recognized tribes. That obligation is a welcome change from many
210 [Vol. 34
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past incidents in which Colorado chose to treat tribes as adversaries, rather
than as co-sovereigns with whom it shares both a political relationship and a
common destiny. Because the classification in question is political, it does not
violate the Colorado Racial Preference Ban.
II FHSU'S Tuition Waiver Policy Fully Complies with the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiffs allege that the FHSU policy violates the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and base the allegations on two alternative
theories. First, they contend that the policy discriminates on the basis of race
and fails to satisfy the strict-scrutiny standard warranted by such
discrimination. They also claim that, even if the policy is not racially
discriminatory, it impermissibly discriminates against Indians who do not
satisfy the eligibility criteria and also exceeds the authority that states have in
setting Indian policy.
Plaintiffs' arguments mischaracterize the aim of the policy and the means
by which it is to be accomplished. The district court correctly rejected their
crabbed reading of the policy and the infelicitous understanding of Supreme
Court precedent on which it depends. Because the policy relies on political
classification rather than racial categories to establish its eligibility criteria, it
is subject to a rational-basis standard, not strict scrutiny. As the district court
held, it is manifestly constitutional under this standard, and the plaintiffs'
challenge to it should not survive a motion for summary judgment.
A. FHSU's Tuition Waiver Policy Enacts Politically Based Preferences
That Are Based on the Quasi-Sovereign Status of Two Federally
Recognized Tribes
1. The FHSU Policy Does Not Promote Invidious Racial Discrimination;
It Merely Recognizes the Unique Political Status ofAmerican Indians
The legal status of Indian tribes is singular in character and has long
triggered differential treatment that springs from the unique responsibilities the
federal government owes to them. See supra Part I-A-1. For purposes of
equal protection analysis, Indians are not similarly situated to other citizens.
As a result, it is not discriminatory to treat Indians differently. Instances of
differential treatment encompass multiple policy areas and vary significantly
in their effects. See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977)
(rejecting claim that disparity between federal law and state law violated the
Equal Protection Clause when federal jurisdiction was predicated on
defendant's status as an enrolled member); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535
211No. 1]1
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(1974) (upholding a Bureau of Indian Affairs policy of granting preferences
to Indians in its hiring and promotion procedures); McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (holding that state income tax
could not be enforced against enrolled Navajos who resided on the Navajo
reservation and whose income was wholly derived from within that
reservation); see also 18 U.S.C. §1301 (2006) (exempting tribes from
providing right to counsel to indigent defendants at their own expense when
prosecuting the defendant in tribal court); 42 U.S.C. § § 2000e(b)-2000(e)-2(i)
(2006) (distinguishing permissible employment preferences accorded to
Indians from racial discrimination that is expressly prohibited under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act).
Though distinctions based on tribal membership appear in a multitude of
forms, all are predicated on political affiliation, not racial or ethnic categories.
Accordingly, the relevant analytic principle is not contained in the line of
equal-protection cases in which the Supreme Court has wrestled with the
legality of affirmative-action programs. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that the University of Michigan Law School's
admissions selection process, which considered race as an admission criteria
but did not treat it as determinative and which undertook individualized review
of each applicant, satisfied strict scrutiny); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003) (holding that the University of Michigan's undergraduate admissions
selection process, which automatically gave weight to an applicant from an
underrepresented ethnic group, failed to satisfy strict scrutiny); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Peila, (1995) (holding that the Department of
Transportation's affirmative-action program offering incentives to contract
with "disadvantaged business enterprises" failed to satisfy strict scrutiny); City
ofRichmondv. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that the City of
Richmond's affirmative-action program for minority contractors failed to
satisfy strict scrutiny).
The Supreme Court first differentiated Indian preferences from invidious
racial classifications in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). See supra
Part I-A. The Court found that an employment preference did not sanction
"racial discrimination," or even a racial preference, but was granted to Indians
as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities. Mancari at 553-54. The Court
recently reaffirmed this principle in Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000), in
which it explained that
[a]lthough the classification [at issue in Mancari] had a racial
component, the Court [in Mancari] found it important that the
preference was "not directed towards a 'racial' group consisting of
2 12 [ Vol. 34
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'Indians,"' but rather "only to members of 'federally recognized'
tribes."
... Because the BIA preference could be "tied rationally to the
fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians," and
was "reasonable and rationally designed to further Indian self-
government," the Court [in Mancari] held that it did not offend the
Constitution.
Id. at 519-20 (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24, 555) (citations omitted).
It is true that the Court in Mancari emphasized that the preference was
implemented by, and in the context of employment with, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, an agency it described as "sui generis." Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554.
This could support the inference that such classifications are narrow in scope.
Yet subsequent judicial opinions and a wealth of congressional statutes belie
this inference. The Supreme Court in Cayetano acknowledged that "Congress
may fulfill its treaty obligations and its responsibilities to the Indian tribes by
enacting legislation dedicated to their circumstances and needs." Cayetano,
528 U.S. at 519 (citing Washington v. Washington State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 673 n. 20 (1979) (treaties
securing preferential fishing rights); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641,
645-47 (1977) (acknowledging exclusive federal jurisdiction over crimes
committed by Indians in Indian Country); Delaware Tribal Business
Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84-85 (1977) (distribution of tribal
property); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead
Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 479-80 (1976) (Indian immunity from state taxes);
Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390-91 (1976) (per curiam)
(acknowledging exclusive tribal court jurisdiction over tribal adoptions).
The decisions cited rely on the core justification of Mancari, which likewise
supplies the relevant analytic standard for this appeal: preferences based on the
political relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes are
constitutional so long as they rationally relate to Congress's unique obligation
to tribes. The rational-basis standard gives Congress broad discretion in
determining what action is necessary to make good on its obligation.
Moreover, the means Congress uses to fulfill this obligation are viewed
deferentially. The eligibility criteria that FHSU employs mirror the means that
Congress has used in order to fulfill its unique obligation to Indian tribes.
Accordingly, the eligibility criteria are constitutionally permissible.
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2. Using a Combination ofBlood Quanta, Tribal Membership, and
Ancestral Lineage Is a Permissible Means ofDefining Eligibility Criteria
for Legitimate Non-Racially Based Preferences
Part I-B established the different acceptable criteria that may be used to
identify those individuals who qualify for politically based preferences that
benefit American Indians. When viewed against this body of precedent, the
particular three-tiered system of eligibility FHSU uses when granting tuition
waivers is manifestly constitutional. It relies on tribal membership, blood
quanta, and-as a last available option-evidence of lineal descent combined
with consideration of an applicant's prior life circumstances. This flexible
approach facilitates the goal of expanding educational opportunities for the
class of American Indians the policy targets.
The official policy statement makes clear that connection to either of the
Southern Ute or Ute Mountain Ute tribes is the most relevant criterion for
eligibility. This is apt given that the objective of the policy is to atone for state
action whose effects specifically harmed these tribes. The narrowness of the
criteria is directly connected to the purported goal of the policy itself.
Plaintiffs contend that if the Indian/non-Indian distinction is not
discriminatory, then the distinction based on heritage is discriminatory because
certain Indians who lack connection to a historical Colorado tribe are
excluded. This merely substitutes one misreading of the policy for another.
Plaintiffs characterize the flexible, individuated application of the criteria
in rigid, monolithic terms. See supra Part I-B. The State of Colorado has
assumed a responsibility to descendants of tribes whose collective fate was
adversely impacted by the state's growth and its conscious policy choices.
That responsibility need not be all-encompassing, such that any student who
is "Indian" by virtue of blood quanta or tribal membership is automatically
eligible. This would mirror the mechanistic approach that the Supreme Court
rejected in its most recent college-admissions cases. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (requiring that race-
conscious admissions program involve individualized consideration of race,
rather than assigning it a predetermined weight automatically, in order to
satisfy strict scrutiny). Indeed, it is just this type of approach that could make
"race" an overriding factor in this politically based system of preferences.
It is true that all recipients of the waiver have been ethnically American
Indian, but this is a necessary, not sufficient, condition in order to be granted
a tuition waiver. The crucial factor remains whether a student can establish his
or her ancestral connection to a historical Colorado tribe. It is the historical
relationship that Colorado has with such tribes that gave rise to the decision for
214 [Vol. 34
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Colorado to assume a duty to the narrow class of modem-day descendants,
rather than all Indians. The legislature may go one step at a time in addressing
the problems facing tribes without violating the equal-protection doctrine.
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) ("It is no
requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated
or none at all." Id. at 110.). It is also well-established that the power to make
that decision lies with the legislature, whether that power is used wisely or
improvidently. Williamson v. Lee Optical ofOklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
Second-guessing the mechanism by which the State chose to live up to its
obligation exceeds the proper role of the judiciary. More importantly, it is
unnecessary to do so. The policy effectively secures the laudable-and
constitutional---end for which it is designed: expanding the educational
opportunities of individuals who belong to groups with whom the State of
Colorado has a unique cultural and political relationship.
It is significant to recognize that the decision is not whether a student is to
be admitted into FHSU, but whether he or she is eligible for a tuition waiver.
Tellingly, both plaintiffs received financial assistance, including partial
scholarships, from other sources in order to pay for their higher education.
The policy does not deny them equal protection under the law. It advances a
legitimate state interest using means that are historically appropriate and
legally valid.
B. Because FHSU's Tuition Waiver Policy Is Fully Consistent with Federal
Indian Policies and Advances a Legitimate, Non-Racially Based State
Interest, Its System of Preferences Satisfies the Relevant Rational-Basis
Standard
1. States May Affirmatively Assume Obligations in Indian Affairs So
Long as They Are Consistent with Overarching Federal Policy
The predominant configuration of authority in Indian law emphasizes the
role of the federal government in dealing with tribes and curtails the roles
states play in defining policy goals. Certain pieces of federal legislation have
delegated power to the states, e.g., Public Law 280, which gave certain states
on-reservation jurisdiction. The general principle, however, remains in place:
the most fundamental government-to-government relation in Indian Country
is between the federal government and Indian tribes.
The original rationale for this configuration was the perceived hostility that
states had to tribal interests and the perceived inability of tribes to protect
themselves. This rationale was at the forefront of the Supreme Court's
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decision in United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), which upheld
federal criminal jurisdiction over Indian Country:
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are
communities dependent on the United States. Dependent largely
for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe
no allegiance to the states, and receive from them no protection.
Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where they
are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very
weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing
of the federal government with them, and the treaties in which it
has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it
the power.
Id. at 383-84. Almost 125 years have passed since the Kagama decision. In
that interval, the guiding ethos of paternalism and racial prejudice evidenced
in the opinion has been supplanted by a commitment to meaningful tribal self-
determination. Similarly, the assumption that states are by their very nature
hostile to the best interests of Indian people has been jettisoned. In its place
sits a provisional authority providing that states may act on behalf of tribes so
long as their policies are consistent with the special political relationship tribes
have with the federal government. FHSU's tuition waiver policy is just such
a policy: it amplifies the educational opportunities available to members of
two federally recognized tribes and therefore increases the prospect of
meaningful tribal self-determination.
Ample precedent supports the authority of individual states to enact
legislation beneficial to Indian tribes and their members when it adheres to
pre-existent federal policy. E.g., Washington v. Washington Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (state regulations of
hunting and fishing); Artichoke Joe's Caifornia. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353
F.3d 712, 733 (9th Cir. 2003) (state gaming laws); Livingston v. Ewing, 601
F.2d 1110 (10th Cir. 1979) (state arts-and-crafts preference for Indians);
McBride v. Shawnee County, Kansas Court Services, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (D.
Kan. 1999) (state recognition ofNative American Church); St. Paul Intertribal
Housing Board. v. Reynolds, 564 F. Supp. 1408 (D. Minn. 1983) (state
housing programs); Krueth v. Independent SchoolDistrictNo. 38,496 N.W.2d
829, 836-37 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (state employment preference for Indian
teachers). This line of precedent clearly supports the reasoning of the court
below when it held that Colorado's policy comported with the requirements
of equal protection. Plaintiffs would contend that no state may establish
legislation that creates a system of preferential treatment in accord with what
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Congress has done previously. This view is at odds with current law; if
accepted, it would seriously hamstring states' efforts to rectify the morass of
problems that negatively impact the lives of their Indian citizens.
It is true that federal circuit courts have struck down preferential policies on
the ground that such policies did not originate in Congress. See Malabed v.
North Slope Borough, 335 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2003) (striking down ordinance
adopted by local government that gave an employment preference to Indians);
Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power
District, 154 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 1998) (striking down hiring preference of
Navajos implemented by corporation); Tafoya v. City ofAlbuquerque, 751 F.
Supp. 1527 (D.N.M. 1990) (striking down a city's permitting policy that
exclusively benefited members of federally recognized tribes). This line of
cases is reconcilable with the long line of precedent affirming state authority.
None of the cases striking down differential treatment involves a policy
enacted at the state level. Malabed struck down a local ordinance,
Dawavendewa struck down a private corporation's policy, and Tafoya struck
down a city policy. Accordingly, there is nothing but the most tenuous
connection between this line of cases and the question of what limits a state
must observe when acting on behalf of Indian tribes.
There is a vast difference between the power of local municipalities and the
power of states in the area of Indian affairs. States and tribes must address a
litany of mutually applicable issues on a daily basis, whether they turn on
issues of jurisdiction, civil regulation, or management of shared resources.
There is also a significant difference in the responsibility that a state owes to
its tribal citizens. To conflate the status of states with that of local
municipalities or private corporations is to draw a false inference that obscures
the issues at stake.
Important policy considerations must also be considered when evaluating
plaintiffs' theory of the limited authority of states in Indian affairs. Political
theorists and judges have long recognized the significant role that states play
in producing innovative policies that respond to particular problems. See, e.g.,
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country."). The power to pursue innovation to help facilitate tribal
development is of immense significance. States should be encouraged to work
with tribes to develop policies that are mutually beneficial; plaintiffs urge that
they should be admonished for attempting to do so. This position is untenable
given the long line of legal precedent affirming state authority and the clear
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policy drawbacks that would follow from removing that authority. The district
court correctly surmised that the FHSU policy reflects the conscious choice to
assume an obligation to Indian tribes that is entirely consistent with
overarching federal policy. That conclusion should be upheld.
2. Employing Non-Racially Based Preferences in the Context of
Education Is Rationally Related to Achieving the Aim of Tribal Self-
Governance and Tribal Self-Sufficiency
The unique obligation owed to Indian tribes is especially pressing in the
context of education. Education has been a central component of the tribal-
federal relationship from its inception. Yet the manner in which the federal
government imposed its own educational vision and values on tribes has
historically been "as much a curse as a blessing." Cohen's Handbook of
Federal Indian Law 1356 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., Michie 2005). To
foster assimilation and end resistance to colonization, the federal government
"sanctioned removing young children from their homes, punishing them for
speaking their Native languages, and even denying parents subsistence rations
if they did not send their children to school." Id. This tainted legacy has been
disavowed in the modem era.
Emphasis on tribal autonomy, culturally relevant curricula, and improvement
in educational opportunities marks the modem era. Congressional efforts to
realize these goals include the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act (ISDEAA), 25 U.S.C. §450 et seq., and continue more recently
with the Native American Education Improvement Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-110, Title X, pt. D (2002). Though such statutes signal dramatic
improvement over those that preceded them, many Indian students continue to
perform below average and do not enjoy the same educational opportunities as
their non-Indian counterparts. Thus, legislative programs that deliver
educational services and support to American Indians are still vitally necessary.
Congress has recognized the need to tailor educational programs and policies
so they cohere with the government's unique responsibility to Indian people.
One focus has simply been getting more input from tribes and more Indian
educators in schools. For example, the Court in Mancari cited 20 U.S.C. §
887c(a) and (d), provisions in the Education Amendments of 1972 that
"explicitly require that Indians be given preference in Government programs
for training teachers of Indian children." Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,
548 (1974). Emphasis has also been placed on expanding higher-education
opportunities for Indians by offering targeted financial support of tribal
colleges. See, e.g., Tribally Controlled College or University Assistance Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 901, 112 Stat. 1828 (2006) (allocating funding to
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encourage development of tribally controlled colleges and to provide them with
stable operational support). More significantly, there are also grants that
expressly and exclusively target Indian students who seek assistance in their
pursuit of higher education. See 25 C.F.R. § 40 (2008). Indeed, an entire
subchapter of the United States Code-25 U.S.C. § 35-is devoted to statutes
whose exclusive focus is expanding opportunities in higher education for
Indian peoples.
Though the special-relationship doctrine confers certain responsibilities
regarding Indian education on the federal government, Congress is not alone
in recognizing the need for ameliorating the negative effects of past policies.
States have also addressed Indian education, both in their curricula and
policies. See, e.g., Indian Education Division, State of New Mexico, http://
www.ped.state.nm.us/indian.ed/; Indian Education For All Program, State of
Montana, http://opi.state.mt.gov/indianed2/; Office ofIndian Education, Indian
Education Council, State of South Dakota, http://doe.sd.gov/Secretary/
indianed/; Office of Indian Education State ofArizona, http://www.ade.state.az.
us/asd/indianed/. The State of Colorado has chosen to address Indian education
in a number of ways. It includes Indian education as a featured program in its
At Risk Students/Prevention Initiatives. http://www.cde.state.co.us/index_
atrisk.htm. The FHSU tuition waiver policy parallels this effort at the
collegiate level. It acknowledges and attempts to rectify the tangible role that
the State of Colorado played in displacing the Ute Mountain Ute and Southern
Ute tribes and adopting "educational programs designed to destroy the cultural
and political life of Colorado's tribes."
Colorado's programs are of a piece with the federal government's objective
of assisting American Indian tribes and constituent members to develop the
capacities necessary for effective, meaningful self-determination. Thus,
preferences akin to those at the center of the FHSU tuition waiver policy have
routinely been codified into law by Congress and upheld in federal courts under
a rational-basis standard. So long as this standard is satisfied, the preferences
abide by all the relevant constitutional requirements. The inquiry into the basis
for the FHSU policy reveals a clear determination that it is necessary to
advance the legitimate state interest in assuring that American Indians students
have access to educational opportunity.
3. The FHSU Policy Clearly Satisfies the Relevant Rational-Basis
Standard for Assessing Non-Racial Preferences That Stem from the
Political Status of Quasi-Sovereign Tribal Entities
As noted previously, the Mancari decision established the analytic
framework for evaluating non-racially based preferences for Indian peoples.
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The Supreme Court found that such preferences must be "tied rationally to the
fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians." Mancari, 417
U.S. at 555. The Court went on to explain that this meant the policy under
review must be "reasonable and rationally designed to further Indian self-
government." Id. The "fit" between the end goal of the FHSU policy and the
means by which the school pursues this goal certainly satisfies this standard.
Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a more narrowly tailored scheme that was
still directed at assuring that Indian citizens who are descendants of tribes with
whom Colorado has a unique relationship have access to educational
opportunities.
The policy must also be viewed in light of the historical injustices that mark
the relationship between Colorado and select Indian tribes that inhabited
geographic territory that now lies within the state. The policy is specifically
intended to rectify these injustices. It notes that
the wealth and prosperity that helped to create the Colorado state
system of higher education can be traced in no small part to the
states [sic] role in divesting the Utes, and other Indian tribes that
inhabited the Colorado territory, of their natural resources, their
hunting grounds, and ultimately their homes.
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. Education has been a polarizing force in the history of
Indian/non-Indian relations. See supra Part II-B-2. The FHSU policy
acknowledges as much, describing how "federal and state policies during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century directed public money to
educational programs designed to destroy the cultural and political life of
Colorado's tribes." Plaintiffs 'Exhibit 1. The tuition waiver policy intervenes
to remedy the problems that past education policies created. The symmetry
between these historical wrongs and the current policy is an indication of
Colorado's attempt to revise the story of Indian education in the twenty-first
century.
Expanded educational opportunities are indisputably necessary if tribes are
to become as robust and self-sufficient as the self-determination paradigm
would have them be. The Supreme Court recognized that "education is perhaps
the most important function of state and local governments." Brown v. Board
ofEducation, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). It is long past the time where an equal
commitment to education should be made in Indian Country. The FHSU policy
has not dramatically reconfigured the educational landscape that Indian
students encounter in the state of Colorado, but it does provide them with
opportunities that would otherwise not exist. It is irrefutable that the policy is
"rationally related" to the unique obligations owed to American Indians. The
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responsibility that Colorado has assumed to the descendants of tribes on whom
it had a negative effect is entirely consistent with Indian education policy at the
federal level. As such, the policy comports with the requirements of the Equal
Protection Clause.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the decision of the lower
court to grant summary judgment to Fort Howe State University in the matter
of Chapman v. Fort Howe State University, XX F. Supp. 3d XXX (2008).
Respectfully submitted,
Counsel for Respondent
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